The central claim of a Consummation Anyway model is that God could bring about eschatological consummation sans the fall—the intended telos of created humanity—apart from the incarnation of Christ. As such, the CA model is an alternative to an Incarnation Anyway model, according to which Christ’s incarnation is a necessary means by which a state of eschatological glory would be achieved sans the fall. This essay seeks to propose an argument for the CA model by drawing from the covenant theology (...) of the Reformed tradition, and it moves in four steps. Firstly, I shall summarize Marc Cortez’s recent arguments for IA, homing in on the major moves that are most relevant for sketching a CA model. Secondly, I will highlight the challenges Cortez has offered against those interested in defending a CA model. Thirdly, I shall sketch a Reformed account of the CA model that seeks to address Cortez’s objections. Fourthly, then, I’ll consider two potential objections against the sketch I have offered for CA, inspired by a recent argument offered by James T. Turner. Finally, I close with a brief conclusion that summarizes some salient features of the proposed thesis. This paper thus proposes at least one way in which the CA thesis could remain a real and live option within this debate. (shrink)

This essay engages with Oliver D. Crisp’s parsimonious model of divine simplicity while offering a defense of a maximal account of simplicity. Specifically, I clarify the way in with Reformed orthodox theologians, like Gisbertus Voetius, anticipate something like Crisp’s model, that pure actuality is an explication, rather than an entailment, of the doctrine of simplicity, and that the doctrine of simplicity remains consistent with epistemic modesty in relation to theological matters.